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Abstract
For many goods (such as experience goods or addictive goods), consumers’ preferences
may change over time. In this paper, we examine a monopolist’s optimal pricing schedule
when current consumption can aﬀect a consumer’s valuation in the future and valuations
are unobservable. We assume that consumers are anonymous, i.e. the monopolist can’t
observe a consumer’s past consumption history. For myopic consumers, the optimal con-
sumption schedule is distorted upwards, involving substantial discounts for low valuation
types. This pushes low types into higher valuations, from which rents can be extracted.
For forward looking consumers, there may be a further upward distortion of consumption
due to a reversal of the adverse selection eﬀect; low valuation consumers now have a strong
interest in consumption in order to increase their valuations. Firms will ﬁnd it proﬁtable
to educate consumers and encourage forward looking behavior.
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11. Introduction
For many goods, consumers’ preferences may change over time. These changes can be related
to learning how much one needs of the good or some property of the good that gives one an
inclination to purchase more. In the ﬁrst case, we might imagine most types of experience goods
(such as electronics or new types of cuisines), in which one experiments with lower quantities or
qualities at ﬁrst to gauge one’s interest. In the second case, we might think of addictive goods
(such as exercise or caﬀeine) where previous consumption increases one’s desire for subsequent
consumption. In this paper we analyze monopoly pricing under asymmetric information when
consumers’ current consumption inﬂuences their future enjoyment of the good.
There are two critical features to our analysis:
• Types are determined by past actions: more consumption today gives a larger probability
of a higher valuation for the good in the next period. This is an intensive margin that
presents a trade-oﬀ for the monopolist - with heterogeneous consumers and asymmetric
information about their valuations, downwards distortion of consumption usually solves
the adverse selection problem, but may now hurt the ﬁrm’s future proﬁts.
• Consumers are anonymous: this implies that the monopolist can’t make current prices
contingent on the consumption history of a customer. One might think of the monopolist
as engaging in repeated relationships that remain anonymous, perhaps because the ﬁrm
distributes through diﬀerent retailers or posts prices that are available to all consumers
(as in the case electronics or restaurants). The monopolist must then choose prices that
balance getting low valuation consumers ‘hooked’ while extracting surplus from high
valuation consumers.
Using these elements we ﬁnd the monopolist’s optimal steady-state pricing schedule. We
look at both the case where consumers are myopic (they only consider today’s utility), and where
they are perfectly forward looking. When types are observable, the monopolist increases quality
substantially (compared to the static ﬁrst best1) at the bottom of the valuation distribution to
get consumers ‘addicted’. We ﬁnd that in the case of myopic consumers, the adverse selection
problem may still distort the quality schedule downwards, but not as much as in the static
case. In order to entice low valuation customers to begin upgrading, the monopolist may oﬀer
substantial discounts, which we deﬁne as pricing below cost. In the case of forward looking
consumers, we ﬁnd a remarkable result: the adverse selection problem distorts the quality
schedule upwards (compared to static ﬁrst best outcome). This distortion is driven by the
fact that low valuation forward looking consumers have a strong preference to consume and
realize type upgrades. In addition we show that it is proﬁtable for the monopolist to educate
consumers and make them forward looking. Note, of course, that we assume that there is no
harmful aspect to increased consumption in the paper.
Examples of products for which current consumption aﬀects future consumption abound. In
software, users often begin using a stripped down version of a program (oﬀered at a substantial
1The static ﬁrst best is deﬁned here as marginal (direct) utility equal to marginal costs for each type.
2discount) before moving on the full version.2 Websites oﬀer basic access (usually for free)
with advertisements for those only browsing, but oﬀer a chance to pay for premium content
and reduced advertising.3 The electronics market consists of many products that have both
reduced functionality and full functionality versions.4 Higher end car manufacturers often have
a low cost entry level car to attract customers to the brand and persuade them to “trade up”
in the future.5 Similarly, people connecting to the internet often start with a slow connection
and then upgrade over time as they start using the internet more and more intensely. And of
course, purely addictive substances such as caﬀeine, exercise or cigarettes have these properties.
Naturally, we must add a caveat to our examples. Previous authors have noted price dis-
crimination in these markets and provided diﬀerent explanations. The majority of the expla-
nations rely on taste heterogeneity. What we provide is another, complementary explanation
and a general framework in which to think about pricing goods whose consumption aﬀects
preferences.
In the dynamic mechanism design literature, papers generally either address agents whose
types remain the same over time or agents whose type is redrawn from a random distribution
in each period. When types are constant over time, short term contracts are inﬂuenced by the
“ratchet eﬀect”: agents’ consumption becomes a signal of their type. Freixas, Guesnerie, and
Tirole (1985), Laﬀont and Tirole (1988), and Skreta (2005) analyze this problem. We avoid the
signaling problem by assuming that the ﬁrm can’t make its mechanism dependent on previous
consumption. This allows us to focus on the interaction between consumption and type and
makes the analysis more tractable. Townsend (1982) models dynamic contracts where agents’
types are generated by a random process. His work was extended by Green (1987), Thomas
and Worrall (1990), and Atkeson and Lucas (1992). The recent literature on dynamic optimal
taxation also assumes that individuals’ types are randomly re-drawn each period. A review of
this literature is provided by Kocherlakota (2005).
There are a couple of models that incorporate a learning by doing eﬀect on types that is
similar to our consumption eﬀect. Baron and Besanko (1984) describe a two period model of
regulation where the ﬁrm’s choice of R&D in period 1 can aﬀect its type in period 2. This
diﬀers from our analysis in two ways. First, the ﬁrms’ choice of R&D doesn’t interact with
the ﬁrm’s ﬁrst period type; in our model it is important that current consumption interacts
with the consumer’s valuation of the good. Second, they analyze the case where the regulator
commits to the two period mechanism (to avoid the ratchet eﬀect) but allows the instruments
in period 2 to depend on reports of type from both period 1 and period 2. Lewis and Yildirim
2Intuit’s program Quicken was oﬀered as Basic Quicken ($20) and Quicken Deluxe ($60). Wolfram Research
sells both Mathematica and a student version of it (which has a lesser computational speed and reduced
functionality). For more examples, see Shapiro and Varian (1998).
3For example www.newyorktimes.com, www.salon.com, and www.thestreet.com are three newspaper websites
which oﬀer diﬀerent levels of access at diﬀerent prices.
4This includes the phenomena of damaged goods, in which the ﬁrm manufactures the fully functional product
and then creates an additional product by adding something to impair the functionality of the original. The
classic cases are those of Intel’s 486SX chip and IBM’s Laserprinter E. See Deneckere and McAfee (1996) for
more details.
5Keller (2003) cites the case of BMW and its 3-series automobiles, as well as Mercedes and its A-Class
vehicles.
3(2002) analyze a dynamic model where there is renegotiation each period, types are redrawn
randomly each period, and the learning by doing reduction of costs is random and doesn’t
interact with the ﬁrm’s type.
Lastly, our model has some similarities to the literature on rational addiction initiated by
Becker and Murphy (1988). In our model, current consumption increases future consumption
(in expectation), so the goods we discuss have the property of addiction. We look at “beneﬁcial”
addictive goods in the sense that utility is increasing in the stock of previous consumption. Our
focus, nevertheless is quite diﬀerent from Becker and Murphy (1988). We focus on monopoly
price discrimination, while they assume consumers are homogeneous and prices are competitive.
In addition, we look at the steady state, while they are also interested in out of steady state
behavior. There are several follow up papers to Becker and Murphy (1988) which look at
pricing, but only in the case of homogeneous consumers. These include Becker, Grossman, and
Murphy (1994), Fethke and Jagannathan (1996), Showalter (1999), and Driskill and McCaﬀerty
(2001).
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 sets up the model and ﬁnds the steady state
distribution of types. Section 3 looks at the optimal quality schedule when consumers are
myopic. Section 4 examines the solution when consumers are forward looking. Section 5
concludes.
2. The Model
Consider a monopolist that sells a product to consumers with utility function u(x,n) = nx−p
where x ≥ 0 is the quality of the good, n ∈ [n0,n1] is the valuation of the consumer for the
product and p is the price paid for the quality x.6 The monopolist’s cost function is represented
by c(x), which is assumed to be increasing and convex. We assume that the outside option of
all consumers is equal to zero.
The good has addictive properties in the sense that the amount x consumed today aﬀects
the consumer’s type n tomorrow. The higher today’s consumption, the higher the consumer’s
expected type tomorrow. Hence, for the ﬁrm, the density (distribution) function f(n) (F(n))
over types [n0,n1] is endogenous. By changing the quality vector x(.), the ﬁrm changes the
distribution of types.
In particular, we assume that consumers live in continuous time τ and at each instant they
have a poisson arrival rate δdτ of a taste shock that can reset their type. For each type n that
isn’t aﬀected by the taste shock, there is a probability φ(x(n)) that its type increases (a type
upgrade) by dn = α(n)dτ over the next instant. We assume that φ′(x) ≥ 0, i.e. consuming
more quality leads to a higher probability of increasing one’s type. This is the learning-by-
consuming or addiction eﬀect that we described previously. We also assume that low n types can
experience bigger upgrades than high n types, i.e. α′(n) ≤ 0. Furthermore, low types cannot
overtake higher types that also experience an upgrade, i.e. d(n+α(n)dτ)/dn = 1+α′(n)dτ ≥ 0.
6Alternatively, we could interpret x as the quantity purchased of the good (with n being an individual’s
valuation per unit purchased).
4Finally, we assume that there is a ﬁnite upper bound n1 on the taste parameter. This implies
that α(n1) = 0 and no type can end up above n1.
In the case where a taste shock does occur, the consumer switches from his current type n to
a newly drawn type from an exogenously given distribution G(.) over [n0,n1] and corresponding
density function g(.). In general, this exogenous distribution may have positive density only on
a subset of types [n0,ε], where ε ≤ n1. Below we sometimes focus on the case where ε is close
to n0. In that case, the shock δ leads to a reduction in n for most types.
We assume that the price-quality schedule doesn’t depend on a consumer’s consumption
history. In addition, we assume that the ﬁrm is suﬃciently patient and maximizes with respect
to the steady state distribution. These assumptions are made for tractability reasons. Given
that types are not randomly drawn each period, we would like to avoid the well known “ratchet
eﬀect”. The complexity of a dynamic optimization problem over types and time also disappears
with this formulation. Nevertheless, we also have a compelling motivation for not allowing the
mechanism to be time dependent. The inability to identify past consumers and their purchasing
patterns is a large concern for retailers. Internet retailers have an easier time identifying
consumers’ purchases, but attempts to condition prices on consumption history have brought
substantial controversy7.
To derive the steady state distribution, we ﬁrst consider how the distribution of types F(.)
varies over time. The following equation shows this time variation over a short instant dτ. To
derive this, it is convenient to temporarily write the distribution as a function of both type n
and time τ. The amount of consumers below type n at time τ + dτ is given by







There is a probability δdτ that a type n gets a taste shock and is redrawn from G(.). Hence
each instant there are δdτG(n) ‘new’ types below n. Of the part that is not aﬀected by this
taste shock, only the group who had types larger than n − α(n′)dτ (where n′ is deﬁned by
n′+α(n′)dτ = n) ﬁnd that a type upgrade α(n′)dτ is big enough to move beyond n. A fraction
φ(x(ν)) of these types experience such an upgrade and move above n. The integral subtracts
exactly this group. Hence at τ + dτ there are two types of consumers who used to be (at time
τ) below n and are now above it - the group who experiences a taste shock and draws a type
larger than n from G(.), and the types ν ∈  n − α(n′)dτ,n] who get a type upgrade. The
equation above can be rewritten as:
F(n,τ + dτ) − F(n,τ)
dτ










7The most famous example is Amazon.com’s attempt at dynamic pricing. When consumers and consumer
groups learned that the same good was being oﬀered at diﬀerent prices depending on consumption history at
Amazon, complaints forced Amazon to rescind the policy and oﬀer rebates to those who had previously been
aﬀected (see “Amazon backs oﬀ on price-testing eﬀorts”, by Deborah Kong, USA Today, September 29, 2000).
5We take the limit dτ → 0 and ﬁnd (note that the third term on the right hand side converges
to zero as dτ → 0):
dF(n,τ)
dτ
= δ(G(n) − F(n)) − φ(x(n))f(n)α(n)
The steady state distribution is constant over time, i.e.
dF(n,τ)
dτ = 0. Thus we ﬁnd that for
each n it must be the case that:
δ(G(n) − F(n)) = α(n)φ(x(n))f(n) (1)
This equation says that in the steady state the net inﬂow of people to types below n due
to a taste shock equals the outﬂow of types due to the upgrading eﬀect.
3. Myopic Consumers
3.1. The Static Benchmarks
In this section we provide two benchmarks. In both, we consider a simpliﬁed model, where
both the ﬁrm and the consumer are myopic. We deﬁne myopic as only being concerned about
current period (instant) returns. Therefore the ﬁrm takes the distribution of types F(.) as
given. That is, it does not understand the relation between consumption and types given by
the distribution in equation (1). The myopic consumer not only doesn’t take into account












[−u(n) + nx(n) − c(x(n))]f(n)dn
In the static ﬁrst best (SFB) framework, the ﬁrm can observe individuals’ types. The solu-
tion is straightforward; the ﬁrm sets every agent’s utility equal to zero (making the participation
constraint bind) and sets the quality such that n − c′(xSFB(n)) = 0. The quality xSFB(n) is
increasing in n, as are prices.
In the static second best (SSB) framework, the ﬁrm can’t observe the types of consumers.
Thus, the monopolist is subject to the incentive compatibility (IC) constraint that each type n
chooses the right (x(n),p(n)) combination from the menu (x(.),p(.)) oﬀered.8 A consumer of
type n announces type ˆ n to maximize utility u(n) given by
u(n) = max
ˆ n
[nx(ˆ n) − p(ˆ n)] (2)
8Using the revelation principle, we can indeed focus on such direct revelation mechanisms.
6Hence we ﬁnd that in an IC mechanism it is the case that
u
′(n) = x(n) (3)













x(t)dt − c(x(n))]f(n)dn (5)











x(n) − c(x(n))]f(n)dn (6)







provided that xSSB(n) is nondecreasing in n to guarantee that the solution is incentive com-
patible (see Fudenberg and Tirole (1991: 261)). If xSSB is decreasing in n over some range, the
solution needs to be ”ironed out” using the procedure described in Fudenberg and Tirole (1991:
303-306). We do not explicitly characterize the solution in this case, but assume throughout
that dxSSB(n)/dn ≥ 0.
Although the ﬁrm disregards how the schedule aﬀects the distribution of types, we haven’t
assumed this eﬀect away. In equation (7), it is clear that the distribution also aﬀects the optimal
schedule. We provide an example that solves for the optimal schedule given the distribution
eﬀect.
Example 1 Consider the case where [n0,n1] = [10,11] and G(n) = 1 for n ≥ 10.1.9 Further
assume that α(n) = 0.1(11 − n),φ(x) = x,δ = 1 and c(x) =
1
2x2. Hence we ﬁnd xSSB(n) =
n
1+0.1(11−n) for n ≥ 10.1. In ﬁgure 1 the dotted curve gives this solution. We also plot the static
ﬁrst best solution xSFB, which is strictly larger than xSSB except at the top of the valuation
distribution.
9We think of 10.1 as being close to n0. In fact, we could have chosen n0 = 10.099 to make it closer to 10.1
and the solution for n ≥ 10.1 would have been unaﬀected. The point is that for values of n with G(n) = 1, the
solution xSSB(n) does not depend on the details of the distribution G(.).













Figure 1: Consumption level x as function of taste parameter n ≥ 10.1
for the DFB case (solid), the SFB case (dot-dashed), the M case (dash)
and the SSB case (dot).
3.2. First Best with a Forward Looking Firm
We now allow the ﬁrm to maximize long run proﬁts and take into account the type upgrad-
ing eﬀect. We assume that the instantaneous discount rate is ρ ∈  0,1  and that types are
observable. When the ﬁrm contracts with a consumer of type n, its discounted proﬁts are:





The ﬁrst term represents the current proﬁts from a consumer of type n. The second term is
the proﬁts if the consumer doesn’t have a taste shock - with probability φ(x(n)) he has a taste
upgrade to n+α(n)dτ and otherwise he remains the same type. The third term is the expected
value of proﬁts if the consumer has a taste shock. We note that the probabilities (1−(ρ+δ)dτ)
and δdτ come from linearizing e−(ρ+δ)dτ and e−ρdτ − e−(ρ+δ)dτ, respectively. Manipulating the
expression and dividing by dτ yields:





where we have used the Taylor approximation π(n+α(n)dτ)−π(n) = α(n)dτπ′(n) since dτ is




































Therefore the discounted total proﬁts is simply the discounted total revenues minus the dis-
counted total costs. This shouldn’t be very surprising, given that in the steady state the
distribution of types remains the same at each instant. To eliminate prices, once again we





{nx(n) − u(n) − c(x(n))}f(n)dn
Since the ﬁrm knows the type of each agent, it can make the participation constraint bind,
setting u(n) = 0 for all n. This makes the maximization problem (taking into account the







This is an optimal control problem. The state variables are F(n) and x(n) and the control
variable is f(n). The costate variable for F(n) is λ(n), and µ(n) is the Lagrange multiplier
associated with the steady state distribution of types constraint. The endpoints of F(n) are
deﬁned: F(n0) = 0 and F(n1) = 1. The ﬁrst order conditions (Euler equations) for x,F and f





′(n) = µ(n)δ (9)
nx(n) − c(x(n)) − λ(n) + µ(n)α(n)φ(x(n)) = 0 (10)
Instead of setting the marginal proﬁt on type n, n − c′(x(n)), equal to zero as in the static
ﬁrst best, the ﬁrm now takes into account the eﬀect that more consumption of quality has on
type upgrading. The second equation gives the diﬀerential equation for λ(n). Finally, equation
(10) equalizes marginal costs and beneﬁts of a small increase in f(n).
The fact that α(n1) = 0 yields that x(n1) coincides with the static ﬁrst best solution
(n1 − c′(x(n1)) = 0). In addition, the condition n1x(n1) − c(x(n1)) − λ(n1) = 0 holds.
We can prove that the distortion of x(n) is an upwards distortion from the static ﬁrst best
solution. The main step is to prove that µ(n) ≥ 0 or equivalently nx(n) − c(x(n)) − λ(n) ≤ 0.
We denote the solution as xDFB(n), where DFB signiﬁes “dynamic ﬁrst best”.
9Proposition 1 For all n ∈ [n0,n1 , xDFB(n) > xSFB(n).
Proof. We begin by proving that nx(n) − c(x(n)) − λ(n) ≤ 0 for all n. Suppose not, i.e.
nx(n) − c(x(n)) − λ(n) > 0 for some n. Using equation (10), we see from equation (9),
λ′(n) < 0 and from equation (8), n−c′(x(n)) > 0. Therefore the derivative with respect to n of
nx(n)−c(x(n))−λ(n), x(n)+(n−c′(x))
dx
dn−λ′, is positive. Since, n1x(n1)−c(x(n1))−λ(n1) = 0,
we ﬁnd a contradiction (it can’t be that nx(n) − c(x(n)) − λ(n) is positive and increasing for
all n).
Now suppose nx(n) − c(x(n)) − λ(n) = 0 for any n ∈ [n0,n1 . This implies that µ(n) = 0.
Taking the derivative of nx(n)−c(x(n))−λ(n) = 0 yields the equation n−c′(x(n)) =
−x(n)
x′(n) , using
µ(n) = 0 and equation (9 ). However, since µ(n) = 0, equation (8) gives us n − c′(x(n)) = 0.
This gives us a contradiction.
Therefore, for all n ∈ [n0,n1 , nx(n) − c(x(n)) − λ(n) < 0 and µ(n) > 0. Using this fact
and equation (8) proves the proposition.
This demonstrates that the dynamic ﬁrst best sells higher qualities to all consumers (except
the highest valuation consumer) than the static ﬁrst best. This is intuitive since the ﬁrm now
takes into account the fact that raising x(n) makes it more likely that type n < n1 upgrades to
a higher (and more proﬁtable) type. In addition, the quality schedule is strictly greater than
the static second best schedule for all n except for n1.
If, in this case, a quality level ¯ x was reached where any additional quality changes would have
no eﬀect in changing the probability of upgrading (i.e. φ′(x) = 0 for x > ¯ x and ¯ x < xDFB(n1)),
the upward distortion of quality would disappear. That is, if x(ˆ n) = ¯ x, then for all n > ˆ n,
qualities would be equal to those of the static ﬁrst best.
We now look at an example of the schedule we described.




















with boundary condition x(n1) = n1. The solution of this diﬀerential equation, xDFB(n), is the
solid line in ﬁgure 1.
103.3. Second Best with a Forward Looking Firm
We now assume that the monopolist is forward looking and knows that consumers are myopic,
but doesn’t observe their valuations. The monopolist’s task is to encourage consumption and
make consumers realize these type enhancements in order to extract rents from them while
taking into account incentives for consumers to misstate their type. Incentive Compatibility is
still given by u′(n) = x(n). Hence the optimal control problem for the ﬁrm (once again setting





[nx(n) − c(x(n))]f(n) − (1 − F(n))x(n) +
λ(n)(F
′(n) − f(n)) + µ(n)(α(n)φ(x(n))f(n) − δ(G(n) − F(n))dn
As above, the endpoints of F(n) are deﬁned: F(n0) = 0 and F(n1) = 1. The ﬁrst order








′(n) = x(n) + δµ(n) (12)
nx(n) − c(x(n)) − λ(n) + µ(n)α(n)φ(x(n)) = 0 (13)
The ﬁrst equation equates the margin n − c′(x(n)) to the informational rent and the type
upgrading margin (which we saw in the dynamic ﬁrst best). The second equation gives the
diﬀerential equation for λ(n). Equation (13) equalizes marginal costs and beneﬁts of a small
increase in f(n).
The shape of the optimal quality schedule can be compared easily to our benchmarks.
Consider n = n1. Since α(n1) = 0, it must be that n1 − c′(x(n1)) = 0. This proves that
there is a “no distortion at the top” result, where the quality consumed by the highest type
here is equivalent to that consumed by the highest type in the dynamic ﬁrst best (as well as
the static ﬁrst best and the static second best). We also note that equation (13) implies that
n1x(n1)−c(x(n1))−λ(n1) = 0. We denote the solution as xM(n), where M stands for myopic.
As with the SSB case above, for xM(n) to be incentive compatible, we need dxM(n)/dn ≥ 0.
If the solution generated by the equations above, is decreasing in n over some range, it needs
to be ”ironed out” to get xM. We assume that dxM(n)/dn ≥ 0 holds for all n and below derive
conditions under which xM is strictly increasing in n. The following lemma helps us to get
some insight into the shape of xM(n).
Lemma 1 For each n it is the case that
nx(n) − c(x(n)) − λ(n) ≤ 0
with strict inequality for some non-empty interval.
11Proof. We ﬁrst prove the weak inequality holds by contradiction. Suppose not, i.e. suppose
there exists n′ such that n′x(n′) − c(x(n′)) − λ(n′) > 0. Isolate µ(n′) < 0 in equation (13) and
substitute it into equation (12). This implies that λ′(n′) < x(n′). Hence we ﬁnd







where the last inequality follows from n′ − c′(x(n′)) ≥ 0 (see equation (11)) and x′(n′) ≥ 0.
However, nx(n)−c(x(n))−λ(n) > 0 and increasing in n contradicts n1x(n1)−c(x(n1))−λ(n1) =
0.
Next, we prove that the strict equality holds for some non-empty interval. If it didn’t, then
nx(n) − c(x(n)) − λ(n) = 0 for all n. This implies that µ(n) = 0 for n ∈  n0,n1 . Taking
the derivative of nx(n) − c(x(n)) − λ(n) = 0 yields the equation (n − c′(x(n)))x′(n) = 0, using
µ(n) = 0 and equation (12). But µ(n) = 0 also implies c′(x(n0)) < n0. Together with x′(n) = 0
and c′(x(n1)) = n1 > n0 this yields a contradiction.
Using equation (11), this result gives us the following:
Proposition 2 Assume that there exists ˜ n < n1 such that G(˜ n) = 1. Then for all n ≥ ˜ n
the quality schedule xM(n) ≥ xSSB(n). Furthermore, there is a non-empty interval where
xM(n) > xSSB(n).
The monopolist pushes up the qualities consumed relative to the static second best in
order to take advantage of the boost in demand created for its product from high types. This
increase in quality doesn’t aﬀect the whole schedule. At the top, the consumer is kept at the
static eﬃcient point. There is little reason to distort the consumption upwards at the top since
this type is not able to beneﬁt from the upgrading eﬀect.
This intuition allows us to explore the schedule further. Imagine that for large enough
consumption x > ¯ x, there was no eﬀect in changing the probability of upgrading, i.e. φ′(x) = 0.
Also suppose that xM(n0) < ¯ x < xM(n1), meaning that for types above some cutoﬀ ˆ n, there
is no longer a marginal upgrading eﬀect. Then for all n > ˆ n, xM(n) = xSSB(n) (this can be
seen from equation (11)). That is, when there is no marginal upgrading eﬀect, the upwards
distortion on consumption is not optimal for the monopolist.
The advantage of the assumption in the above proposition on the cutoﬀ ˜ n (where for all
n ≥ ˜ n we have G(n) = 1) is that it yields a very useful simpliﬁcation. In particular, for




δ and we can directly characterize the quality
schedule. We use it once again in the following lemma to show that the quality schedule is
strictly increasing.
Lemma 2 Assume that there exists ˜ n < n1 such that G(˜ n) = 1. Then φ′′(.) ≤ 0 implies that
dxM(n)/dn > 0 for all n ≥ ˜ n.
12Proof Substituting for
1−F(n)
f(n) and µ(n) in equation (11) and using the implicit function













φ2 (λ − nx + c(x)) +
φ′
φ (n − c′(x))
We prove that this expression is positive. First, note that the numerator is positive as α′(.) ≤
















































which is positive given that c′′ ≥ 0 and φ′′ ≤ 0. Q.E.D.
Finally, consider the following example to compare the myopic outcome with the schedules
derived before.
Example 3 Using the same speciﬁcations and parameter values as in the previous examples,
we can write the ﬁrst order conditions as follows for n ≥ 10.1:
µ(n) =









Diﬀerentiating the last equation with respect to n and combining it with equation (12) yields
the following diﬀerential equation in x(.):
x
′(n) =





together with the boundary condition x(n1) = n1. The solution to this diﬀerential equation,
xM(n), is given by the dashed line in ﬁgure 1. The ﬁgure illustrates that xM(n) ≥ xSSB(n),
with a strict inequality for an interval.
133.4. Discounts and prices below cost
A natural question arises when the monopolist increases quality for low types to encourage
upgrading: what do prices look like? Do we observe the phenomena of discounting? Discounts
(or introductory oﬀers) often arise in the literature on experience goods10; however the main
explanation given for the use of discounts is the presence of quality uncertainty by consumers.
Low prices encourage experimentation and can boost future demand for the ﬁrm. Our explana-
tion, that low prices promote upgrading, encompasses this story and allows for addiction eﬀects
as well.
The brief answer to our question is that prices can be very low in our model, and in what
follows we describe an example where prices can actually be below cost for low types. The
monopolist sells at a loss in order to create higher types to extract rents from.
Assume the function φ(x) takes the form:
φ(x) =
￿
0 if x < ¯ x
φ if x ≥ ¯ x
where ¯ x is the quality level at which upgrading begins. Hence we assume that a consumer who
consumes low quality doesn’t get a taste for what the high end good could yield. Therefore,
such consumption of low quality does not generate an upgrade. An internet user with a poor
connection, for example, may never experience the convenience of downloading music and will
not be tempted to upgrade her connection.
Furthermore, let the exogenous distribution G(n) be a uniform distribution on [n0,n1g], i.e.
G(n) =
n−n0
n1g−n0, and the cost function be quadratic, c(x) =
1
2x2. The following assumption
reduces the number of cases that we need to consider below.
n1g¯ x − c(¯ x) = 0
This equation implies ¯ x = 2n1g.
This equation says that if the ﬁrm decides to sell ¯ x to types n < n1g, it sells at a price below
costs. Since the maximum one could charge type n1g would be n1g¯ x (due to the participation
constraint), any price below that would lose the ﬁrm money. The ﬁrm breaks even by extracting
all of type n1g’s surplus, and therefore would lose money if it encouraged lower types to consume
¯ x and upgrade. This leaves the ﬁrm with two options: sell qualities below ¯ x to all consumers
and have no upgrades, or to sell high quality goods and encourage upgrades. The second
option, which by construction involves prices below costs, will be more proﬁtable for certain
parameters.
First, we examine the case where the ﬁrm sells qualities below ¯ x and no upgrading occurs.





10For example, see Shapiro (1983), Schlee (2001), and Gabszewicz, Pepall, and Thisse (1992). Price discrim-
ination in these models is intertemporal. Our model has both static (i.e. within period) and intertemporal
price discrimination.
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Figure 2: Proﬁts as a function of
αφ
δ for the case without (dash) and
with (solid) upgrading.
Since x(n) < ¯ x for all n ∈ [n0,n1g], there will not be any upgrading. With the functions that
we chose and assuming in addition that 2n0 ≥ n1g, we ﬁnd that:
x(n) = 2n − n1g







[p(n) − c(x(n))]g(n)dn = (4n
2
0 − 2n0n1g + n
2
1g)/6
Second, we look at a quality schedule where upgrading occurs. The schedule we choose may
not be the optimum, but since we prove that it can yield higher proﬁts than the case without
upgrading, the optimum (for those parameters) must involve upgrading. Moreover, since any
case with upgrading involves pricing below cost, deep discounts will be a part of the optimal
solution (for those parameters).
Suppose all types in the interval [n0,n1g] are sold ¯ x. It follows that p(n) = n0¯ x for these
types, otherwise type n0 would not buy. Since x(n) cannot fall (by incentive compatibility) and
there is no reason to sell qualities in excess of ¯ x, we ﬁnd x(n) = ¯ x for all n ∈ [n0, ¯ n] where ¯ n is
deﬁned by
¯ n − c
′(¯ x) =
1 − F(¯ n)
f(¯ n)
Thus, the quality schedule for types in the interval [¯ n,n1] is given by n−c′(x) =
1−F(n)
f(n) . To
determine F(n) we assume that α(n) = α   (n1 − n) for some scalar α > 0. Substituting this






For n > n1g, G(n) = 1. Using F(n1) = 1 we ﬁnd that





αφ for n > n1g
for some constant C > 0 to be determined below.





δ (n1 − n0) − (n − n0) +
αφ







δ − 1)(n1g − n0)
for n ≤ n1g



















δ (n1 − n). Thus we ﬁnd
¯ n =
αφ











consumers. Since n0¯ x − c(¯ x) < 0 the ﬁrm makes a loss on these consumers. To types n > ¯ n
the ﬁrm sells







From this we can calculate the proﬁts for n > ¯ n in the standard way.
Now we can analyze whether it is optimal for the ﬁrm to sell ¯ x to the low types at a loss
such that the upgrading can take eﬀect. We consider the parameters n0 = 1,n1g = 2, and
n1 = 10. Proﬁts in the no-upgrading solution (when x(n) < ¯ x for all n) are then equal to 2/3.
Selling ¯ x to low types leads to proﬁts as depicted in ﬁgure 2. Clearly for αφ/δ high enough, it is
optimal for the ﬁrm to sell to low types at a loss. This is intuitive: the stronger the upgrading
eﬀect (because αφ/δ is high) the more proﬁtable the strategy that induces upgrading.
164. Forward Looking Consumers
4.1. First Best
In this section, we assume that consumers understand perfectly the type upgrading process and
take it into account when making consumption decisions. To characterize incentive compatibil-
ity in this case, we ﬁrst derive the expected discounted value of a type n consumer. Denoting
this value by V (n), we can write
V (n) = (nx(n) − p(n))dτ + (1 − (ρ + δ)dτ)((1 − φ(x(n)))V (n) +




Hence the expected discounted value of being of type n consists of three parts. First, the
consumer receives the instant utility nx(n)−p(n) over the short ‘period’ dτ. Second, with some
probability the consumer experiences no taste shock and gets a type upgrade of α(n)dτ with
probability φ(x(n)), or continues with payoﬀ V (n) with probability 1 − φ(x(n)). Third, if the
consumer experiences the taste shock, the payoﬀ is the expectation of the continuation value
V (m), where m is distributed according to the exogenously given density function g(m). Using
the standard techniques of deriving a Bellman equation we get the following equation for V (n):





Rewriting to isolate the price p(n):





We will use this to eliminate prices from the objective function of the ﬁrm. Integrating over






(nx(n) − ρV (n))f(n)dn








(nx(n) − c(x(n)) − ρV (n))f(n)dn (16)
In the ﬁrst best solution, the ﬁrm maximizes proﬁts subject to the equation representing the
steady state distribution of types and the participation constraint. Since types are observable,
the ﬁrm can set V (n) = 0 for all n. This then makes the problem equivalent to the dynamic
ﬁrst best problem when agents are myopic. The solution therefore is the dynamic ﬁrst best
quality schedule, xDFB(n).
174.2. Second Best
To derive incentive compatibility we take one step back and write:
(ρ + δ)V (n) = max
˜ n





Using the envelope theorem we ﬁnd the incentive compatibility condition:
(ρ + δ)V




It is straightforward to see that the solution to the ﬁrst best problem doesn’t hold here.
Suppose V (n) = 0 for the whole interval [n0,n1]. This violates the incentive compatibility
constraint since it produces the equation 0 = x(n) for all n. Since the monopolist could make
positive proﬁts by selling small amounts of the good, it can’t be that x(n) = 0 everywhere.
The following result gives us insight into the value function.
Proposition 3 For functions V (.) that are twice diﬀerentiable we ﬁnd that V ′(n) ≥ 0.
Proof Consider two types n′ > n where n′ can mimic n. We see that
(ρ + δ)V (n
′) ≥ n












Subtract these two equations and consider the case where n′ = n1 (and thus α(n1) = 0):
(ρ + δ)(V (n1) − V (n)) ≥ (n1 − n)x(n) − φ(x(n))V
′(n)α(n)
If there exists n such that V ′(n) < 0 then this equation implies that V (n1) > V (n). Hence
there must exist n′′ ∈  n,n1  such that V ′(n′′) > 0. Since V ′(n) < 0 and V ′(n′′) > 0 it must be
the case that over some range V ′′(.) > 0. In particular, there must exist ˜ n such that V ′(˜ n) < 0
and V ′′(˜ n) > 0. However, this contradicts equation (18). Hence V ′(n) ≥ 0 for all n ∈ [n0,n1].
Q.E.D.
Substituting the fact that V (n) = V (n0) +
R n
n0 V ′(n)dn into the ﬁrm’s objective function






[nx(n) − c(x(n))]f(n) − ρ(1 − F(n))ν(n) +
λ(n)(F
′(n) − f(n)) + µ(n)(α(n)φ(x(n))f(n) − δ(G(n) − F(n)) + ψ(n)(ν
′(n) − ω(n))
+ξ(n)[(ρ + δ − α
′(n)φ(x(n))ν(n) − x(n) − α(n)φ(x(n))ω(n)]dn
18where ν(n) = V ′(n),ω(n) = ν′(n) = V ′′(n), ψ(.) is the costate variable associated with
ν(n), and ξ(.) is a Lagrange multiplier. The ﬁrm is constrained by the steady state distribution
of types equation and incentive compatibility. It is clear from the problem itself that the value
function for the lowest type will be set equal to zero (the participation constraint binds and
V (n0) = 0). In this case, we have ﬁve optimality conditions:
(n − c
′(x(n)))f(n) = −µ(n)α(n)φ





′(n) = ρν(n) + µ(n)δ (20)
0 = nx(n) − c(x(n)) − λ(n) + µ(n)α(n)φ(x(n)) (21)
ψ
′(n) = −ρ(1 − F(n)) + ξ(n)(ρ + δ − α
′(n)φ(x(n))) (22)
0 = ψ(n) + ξ(n)α(n)φ(x(n)) (23)
We elaborate on the solution in the appendix, but go over the important aspects here.
Solving the ﬁfth equation for ξ(n) = −ψ(n)/(α(n)φ(x(n))) and plugging that into the fourth
equation gives us a diﬀerential equation for ψ(n). The solution to the diﬀerential equation














Therefore, ψ(n) is clearly nonnegative, and consequently ξ(n) must be non-positive. In the









d(n + α(n)φ′(x)V ′(n))
dn











′′(n) ≥ 0. (24)
Proof









This equation holds, since V ′(n) ≥ 0 and φ(x) ≥ φ′(x)x. To see the last inequality we use the
following Taylor series
φ(0) = φ(x) + φ






19for some ζ ∈ [0,x]. This can be rewritten as






Looking at the ﬁrst necessary condition (19), using Proposition 4 and ξ(n) ≤ 0, we can then
conclude that the contribution of incentive compatibility is to increase the quality schedule,
rather than reduce it (as it does in the myopic case and the static second best).
This reversal is explained by the diﬀerence between myopic and forward looking consumers.
To dissuade high types from masquerading as low types in the case with myopic consumers
(and in the static case as well), the quality schedule is generally distorted downwards, since
high types have a strong preference for quality over low types. Here however, low types have a
strong preference for quality as well, since they beneﬁt both from the quality now and the type
upgrades in the future.
Nevertheless, the “no distortion at the top” result present in the previous models con-
tinues to hold here. In equation (19), α(n1) = 0 eliminates the ﬁrst term of the right
hand side. Rewriting equation (23) and taking the derivative with respect to n gives us
ψ′(n) = −ξ′(n)α(n)φ(x(n))−ξ(n)α′(n)φ(x(n))−ξ(n)α(n)φ′(x(n))x′(n). Evaluating at n = n1
and comparing to equation (22) evaluated at the same point proves that ξ(n1) = 0. This elim-
inates the second term on the right hand side of equation (19), showing that the quality is set
such that the marginal cost equals the valuation for the top type, without any distortion.
We now prove an intriguing result: the ﬁrm is better oﬀ if the consumer becomes forward
looking instead of myopic. In reality, we see ﬁrms recognizing this eﬀect: ﬁrms selling running
shoes have web sites with information about running, where one can keep a running diary and
have access to other training aids. Car makers encourage test drives of their luxury models and
hype their features. When the consumer can realize the gains of upgrading, the ﬁrm has less
need to push higher quality onto low types at low prices and can make a larger proﬁt.11
Proposition 5 Total proﬁts are larger when consumers are forward looking.
Proof
The solution when the consumer is myopic (and the ﬁrm forward looking) we denoted by
(xM(.),pM(.)). Let (xF(.),pF(.)) denote the solution with forward looking consumers (and
forward looking ﬁrms). We are going to prove that proﬁts from the F case are larger than
proﬁts from the M case. We will do this by ﬁxing the solution to the M case (xM(.),pM(.))
11This might suggest that consumers have the incentive to pretend to be myopic. In a previous version of the
paper, we discuss an example which shows that there is a tradeoﬀ for consumers (i.e. their incentives are not
unambiguous). Two eﬀects are present. Since the lowest type has larger rents (to be extracted) when forward
looking, it is advantageous to pretend to be myopic. On the other hand, the interests of the monopolist and
the forward looking agent may be aligned more than that of the monopolist and the myopic agent in the sense
that both prefer upgrades. Hence, pretending to be myopic may lead to less upgrades and a dissappearance of
surplus (for both the monopolist and the agent).
20and showing that a schedule with slightly higher prices (xM(.),pM(.)+ε) satisﬁes the constraints
of the F case.
From the value function for a forward looking customer:











It therefore follows that V (n0) > 0 and there exists an ε > 0 such that the pricing schedule
pM + ε still satisﬁes the IR constraint.
Next, consider the IC constraint. We ﬁrst argue that a type n who is oﬀered the menu










implies that (using the fact that dxM(n)/dn ≥ 0):
nx
M(n) − p
















Secondly, in the appendix we prove that the ﬁrm will only proﬁt from a customer overstating
his type, i.e. if a type n chooses (xM(n′),pM(n′) + ε) rather than (xM(n),pM(n) + ε), where
n < n′ the ﬁrm makes larger proﬁts. Hence the proﬁts in the F case are at least ε > 0 higher
than in the M case. Q.E.D.
5. Conclusion
This paper develops a framework for analyzing dynamic adverse selection problems where types
may change over time depending on the schedule the principal oﬀers. The key element used in
order to attain tractability is that agents are anonymous, which is often the case. We apply the
model to monopoly pricing, analyzing price discrimination for experience and addictive goods.
We ﬁnd that the monopolist will increase quality for low types to encourage type upgrading.
It may oﬀer substantial discounts at a loss in order to reinforce this eﬀect. For forward looking
consumers, the adverse selection eﬀect distorts quality upwards in contrast to the traditional
static (and myopic) case. Moreover, the monopolist has incentives to make consumers forward
looking, so that it need not sacriﬁce rents to encourage upgrading.
The methodology we develop here could be useful for other dynamic mechanism design
problems where learning by doing plays an important role. A natural extension of the model
would look at price discrimination when addictions are harmful. In addition, one might look at
the regulation of a ﬁrm where marginal costs decrease with know-how and previous production
or repeated auctions where consumers learn their demand for the good (as in electricity sales).
216. Appendix
6.1. Characterization of the Forward Looking solution
We ﬁrst prove a corollary to proposition 3:
Corollary 1 For functions V (.) that are twice diﬀerentiable we ﬁnd that there exists c > 0
such that V ′(n) ≥ c.






























Next note that α(n1) = 0 implies that V ′(n1) =
x(n1)
ρ+δ−α′(n1)φ(x(n1)) > 0. Because γ(n) > 0, if
V ′(n) would become non-positive, it would happen at n1, but it does not. As V ′(n) is strictly
positive for n1, it is strictly positive for all n. The other terms are all nonzero and ﬁnite and
hence we ﬁnd V ′(n) ≥ c for some c > 0. (Note, however, that it does not follow that V ′(n) is
decreasing in n). Q.E.D.
Now we prove that the solution must have the constraint V ′(n) ≥ c binding only on an
interval that begins at n0 (or may only bind at n0).12 This allows us to conclude that ψ(n) ≥ 0
for all n.
I. There is no solution where ψ(n0) = ψ(n1) = 0 and V ′(n) > c for all n
Proof by contradiction: assume ψ(n0) = ψ(n1) = 0 and V ′(n) > c for all n. Then:













where K is the constant from integration. From ψ(n1) = 0, we have K = 0 and ψ(n) ≥ 0
for all n.
12This proof uses the necessary conditions that (i) ψ(n0) = 0 if V ′(n0) > c, and ψ(n0) ≥ 0 if V ′(n0) = c and
(ii) ψ(n1) = 0 if V ′(n1) > c, and ψ(n1) ≤ 0 if V ′(n0) = c. A derivation of these conditions can be found in
Kamien and Schwartz (1991).
22From ψ(n0) = 0, we have
R n1




αφ(x) duds = 0. Since the integral must be
positive, this is a contradiction.
II. It can’t be the case that ψ(n1) < 0 and V ′(n1) = c.
Proof by contradiction: suppose ψ(n1) < 0 . Using equation (23) and the fact that α(n1) =
0, ξ(n1) → ∞. But if ξ(n1) → ∞, then equation (19) indicates that x(n1) → −∞, which
cannot be optimal.
III. It can’t be the case that V ′(n) = c for an interior interval [na,nb] where na > n0.
If this was the case, V ′(na) = c and it must be that V ′′(na − ε) < 0 where ε is small. From
the incentive compatibility equation (18), however, V ′′(na − ε) < 0 implies V ′(na − ε) < c,
which is a contradiction.
IV. The only case remaining is where ψ(n0) > 0 and V ′(n0) = c
6.2. Supplementary proof for proposition 5
Here we will prove that a ﬁrm prefers customers to overstate their types. This completes the
proof that proﬁts from selling to myopic consumers are lower than proﬁts from selling to forward
looking consumers.
Proposition 6 π′(n) ≥ 0.
Proof Suppose it is not true, i.e. there exists ˜ n such that π′(˜ n) < 0. Then one of two
cases must occur:
either (I) π′(n) ≤ 0 for all n ∈ [˜ n,n1]
or (II) there exists n′ ∈  ˜ n,n1] such that π′(n′) > 0.
We argue that neither of these two cases can happen.
First, consider case (I). In this case, the proﬁts of the ﬁrm are higher if all types n ≥ ˜ n
are oﬀered p(˜ n),x(˜ n) since in that case proﬁts are constant per type (for n ≥ ˜ n) and hence
π′(n) = 0 for all n ∈ [˜ n,n1] which implies higher proﬁts than the original menu (p(n),x(n))
which featured π′(n) < 0.
Second, consider case (II). Since π′(˜ n) < 0 < π′(n′) there exist values for n such that
π′(n) ≤ 0 and π′′(n) > 0. Consider two values n∗ < n∗∗ which are close together and satisfy
π′(n∗) < 0 = π′(n∗∗). As the two points are close together, one option for the ﬁrm is to oﬀer

















π(m)g(m)dm = (ρ + δ)π(n
∗)
However, this contradicts π′(n∗) < 0 as π(n∗∗) > π(n∗).
Thus it must be the case that π′(n) ≥ 0. Q.E.D.
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